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“ARMED AND DANGEROUS” A HALF CENTURY
LATER: TODAY’S GUN RIGHTS SHOULD
IMPACT TERRY ’S FRAMEWORK
Alexander Butwin*
Over fifty years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court established
a two-part framework in which police officers may, without a warrant, stop
and search an individual for weapons without violating the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Officers must (1) suspect that criminal activity has occurred, or will soon
occur, and (2) have a reasonable fear that the individual is “armed” and
poses a threat to the responding officers or to others—i.e., “dangerous.” The
second prong’s exact meaning is disputed and has created a split among the
circuits as to whether merely being “armed” inherently makes a gun carrier
“dangerous” and thereby justifies a search.
This Note examines how various courts have approached the issue,
analyzes the split among these approaches, and ultimately argues that, in
light of the significant developments in gun rights, state gun laws should
dictate Terry’s interpretation. Because gun rights are considerably more
expansive today than they were back in 1968, an individual carrying a
firearm, without more, should be insufficient to justify a search under the
Fourth Amendment in states that allow their citizens to publicly carry
firearms.
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INTRODUCTION
Shaquille Robinson, a black male, entered his female friend’s Toyota
Camry in the 7-Eleven parking lot on North Mildred Street—a notorious
high-crime area in Ranson, West Virginia.1 An anonymous tip alerted police
that a black male, in a blue-green Toyota Camry with a white female, was
carrying a loaded gun.2 The officers pursued the vehicle, and upon finding
it, noticed that neither the driver nor the passenger was wearing a seatbelt.3
The officers pulled the car over for the traffic violation, and instead of asking
for identification, the officer who approached the passenger-side door
ordered Robinson out of the car.4 Because of the tip received, the officer
figured that asking Robinson to reach into his pocket would have been a bad
idea.5 The officer then asked Robinson if he was carrying a firearm, to which
Robinson did not verbally respond.6 Instead, he gave the officer a “weird
look” that the officer interpreted to mean “I don’t want to lie to you, but I’m
not going to tell you anything [either].”7

1. United States v. Robinson (Robinson IV), 846 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2017), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 697.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Because of this “weird look,” the officer ordered Robinson to put his hands
on top of the car.8 He then frisked Robinson and found a firearm.9 After
learning that Robinson illegally possessed the firearm, the officer arrested
him.10 Robinson filed a motion to suppress the charges against him,
contesting the legality of the officers’ search—he alleged specifically that the
firearm was only discovered after his Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated.11
Robinson challenged the officer’s frisk in United States v. Robinson.12
This case has a unique procedural history, consisting of four judgments, with
each reversing the preceding one.13 They are each addressed in more detail
in Part II to illustrate the difficulty courts face with regards to the “armed and
dangerous” standard14 from Terry v. Ohio,15 which currently serves as the
guiding authority in Fourth Amendment investigatory stop cases.16
This Note explores the circuit split concerning the “armed and dangerous”
standard from Terry that permits police officers to frisk for weapons while
conducting a temporary investigatory stop.17 More specifically, this Note
addresses whether “armed” should be synonymous with “dangerous” in
states that permit their citizens to publicly carry firearms, or whether treating
the standard’s two terms synonymously constricts one’s Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures18 merely because
one’s Second Amendment and state-given rights to publicly carry firearms
were exercised.19
Part I of this Note provides background on the relevant constitutional,
state, and case law. Part I.A discusses the Second Amendment and current
state law regarding publicly carrying firearms. Part I.B introduces the Fourth
Amendment. And Part I.C explains Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard
for frisks, which courts have inconsistently interpreted and applied.
Part II addresses the competing interests underlying this circuit split. Part
II.A revisits Robinson—a difficult Fourth Circuit case that highlights the
issue. Through its procedural history, Robinson presents both positions of
the split. Part II.B then discusses both sides of the aforementioned split with
regards to whether “armed” inherently means “dangerous” for Terry frisk
purposes.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 161532) (mem.).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 485 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining
that Terry’s framework outlines the protocol to legally conduct a search and seizure during an
investigatory stop).
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See infra Part I.A.
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Part III argues that merely possessing a firearm should not inherently make
a person dangerous for Terry purposes in states that permit their citizens to
publicly carry firearms. Part III.A explains that gun laws have drastically
changed since the Terry opinion was issued and that the standard—
permitting a police officer to conduct a search that is seemingly outside the
Fourth Amendment’s parameters—should consider the legality of carrying a
gun. Finally, Part III.B maintains that equating “armed” with “dangerous”
for Terry purposes violates a gun carrier’s constitutional rights. This Part
also argues that a gun carrier’s potential threat to officer safety, while
important, does not warrant compromising the integrity of constitutional
rights and categorically labeling every gun carrier as “dangerous” regardless
of the legality of their gun possession.
I. THE CONSTITUTION, STATE GUN LAWS, AND THE POLICE’S AUTHORITY
TO FRISK
To understand how a “weird look” can justify a police frisk, it is important
to understand both the legal framework governing police conduct during
investigatory stops and the constitutional guarantees that police frisks of guncarrying individuals implicate. Part I.A surveys the history, meaning, and
purpose of the Second Amendment, as well as the current gun laws that allow
Americans to carry firearms in public in certain states. Part I.B summarizes
the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its search and seizure
protection. Part I.C introduces Terry and its two-part framework that permits
a police officer to conduct a frisk.
A. The Second Amendment’s “Right to Bear Arms” Has Been Given
Meaning
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”20 This Amendment’s meaning, purpose,
importance, and utility have been polarizing topics among scholars, political
pundits, and ordinary citizens.21 Both sides of the debate have turned to the
20. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
21. Compare David Harsanyi, The Second Amendment Has Always Been an Individual
Right, FEDERALIST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/11/29/secondamendment-always-individual-right/ [ https://perma.cc/YS2K-K4U3] (arguing that the
Second Amendment stands for an individual right to bear arms), and David Harsanyi, You
Can Try to Repeal the Second Amendment, but You Can’t Repeal History, NAT’L REV. (Mar.
30, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/second-amendment-individual-gunrights-strong-history/ (same), with Dennis Barron, Opinion, Antonin Scalia Was Wrong About
the Meaning of “Bear Arms,” WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/antonin-scalia-was-wrong-about-the-meaning-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/9243ac665d11-11e8-b2b8-08a538d9dbd6_story.html [https://perma.cc/H49C-N3L2] (arguing that
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008)—the seminal case that interprets the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms—
misinterpreted the meaning of the Second Amendment), and John Paul Stevens, Opinion, John
Paul Stevens:
Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-
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framers’ intention when drafting the Amendment and to the text itself. The
debate centers on whether the Amendment permits individuals to own and
carry firearms for personal use and defense or whether the Amendment
protects a collective right that may only be exercised through formal militia
units.22
Writers and scholars have tried to decode the framers’ original intention.23
The framers knew that their government could one day have the authority to
control its citizens’ access to firearms—something the British had attempted
to do previously.24 Thus, fearing the consequences and their inability to fight
back to restore their freedoms, the framers included the Second Amendment
to safeguard against a tyrannical, oppressive government.25 Alexander
Hamilton, writing in The Federalist Papers, acknowledged that a wellregulated militia could be “the most natural defense of a free country.”26 In
“John DeWitt V,”27 anti-Federalists (who opposed Hamilton and the
Federalists) also acknowledged, “a well regulated militia, composed of the
yeomanry of the country, have ever been considered as the bulwark of a free
people.”28 Having a well-regulated militia that could be ready at a moment’s
notice prevented the need for a standing army, as both Federalists and antiFederalists believed a standing army to be an existential threat to the ideas of
the revolution.29
While the Second Amendment debate continues to be a hot topic in
American politics, two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, District of Columbia

amendment.html [https://perma.cc/34PS-6PX9] (explaining that Justice John Paul Stevens
strongly disagreed with Heller and believed that the Second Amendment should be repealed).
22. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (interpreting the
Second Amendment to bestow an individual right—rather than a collective right—to bear
arms); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., TJ Martinell, 2nd Amendment: Original Meaning and Purpose, TENTH
AMEND. CTR. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/09/22/2ndamendment-original-meaning-and-purpose/
[https://perma.cc/J8JH-HMHA];
Second
Amendment,
HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/topics/united-states-constitution/2ndamendment [https://perma.cc/V7EG-AWYU] (last updated June 7, 2019); Noah Shusterman,
What the Second Amendment Really Meant to the Founders, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/02/22/what-the-secondamendment-really-meant-to-the-founders/ [https://perma.cc/89RJ-X3MW].
24. Martinell, supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton).
27. John DeWitt was the author’s pseudonym for several key anti-Federalist papers.
28. Essay of John DeWitt V, AM. HERALD, Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST: MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW ENGLAND 34, 37 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). On
the issue, Federalists and anti-Federalists simply disagreed over who should have control over
militias: the central government or the states. See Robert Longley, Who Were the AntiFederalists?, THOUGHTCO (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/anti-federalists4129289 [https://perma.cc/Q9VM-6U9R].
29. Shusterman, supra note 23. While the positions of Federalists and anti-Federalists on
each issue regarding our nation’s founding are not important to provide context for this issue,
it is significant that Federalists and anti-Federalists disagreed on most issues but appear to
have agreed on a militia’s importance.
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v. Heller30 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,31 currently control the
Amendment’s legal status.32 Until Heller, courts relied on United States v.
Miller,33 which was thought to suggest that “the Second Amendment protects
only a collective or militia-based right to possess firearms.”34
In Heller, a five-justice majority held that the Second Amendment confers
an individual right to keep and bear arms and declared that any statute
banning handguns in the home or prohibiting their lawful use violates the
Second Amendment.35 The Heller Court found that the Second Amendment
permits having and carrying a firearm unconnected to the militia36 and, in
fact, extends “to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that
were not in existence at the time of the founding.”37
Throughout the detailed opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the
majority, examined founding-era legal scholars’ interpretation of the
Amendment, nineteenth-century case law, and state constitutions to reach the
conclusion that the Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms in
self-defense inside one’s home, unconnected to militia service.38
McDonald followed Heller and held that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment (as recently interpreted by Heller)
against the states, meaning that the right to bear arms applies to state and
local governments, in addition to the federal government.39
Currently, there are only a handful of states that completely forbid their
people from openly carrying firearms,40 as the “right to openly carry a
handgun is considered a protected right under” many state constitutions.41 In
30. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
31. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
32. See generally McDonald, 561 U.S. 742; Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
33. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
34. Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Is Back, Baby,
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 129.
35. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 635.
36. Id. at 610, 612.
37. Id. at 582.
38. See generally id. at 570. To reject the argument that arms are only permissible in a
militia context, Justice Scalia adopted Miller’s definition of “militia”—that is, “the Militia
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” Id. at
595 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179). Justice Scalia supported this definition’s legitimacy by
proclaiming that it comported with founding-era sources, including Federalist No. 46,
Webster’s Dictionary from 1828, and an 1811 letter written by Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 595.
While Miller is thought to have adopted a collective rights theory of the Amendment, Heller’s
holding reinterprets Miller and adopts an individual right to possess firearms. Id. at 622–23.
39. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). Through this incorporation,
states have passed their own laws to expand those rights, allowing firearms to be carried in
public, rather than just inside the home. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017)
(Harris, J., dissenting) (“[S]tate law has followed [Heller and McDonald], providing expanded
rights to carry guns in public.”).
40. See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
REGULATIONS, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 734–35 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 2d ed. 2018). Open
carry of firearms refers to visibly carrying and exposing a firearm on a belt holster. See Justine
E. Johnson-Makuch, Note, Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A Five-Circuit ShootOut, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2757, 2767 (2015).
41. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 736.
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fact, all but six state constitutions contain a provision similar to that of the
Second Amendment.42 About half of states do not require a permit to legally
carry a firearm, whereas approximately sixteen states require state-issued
permits to openly carry a firearm in public.43
Besides open carry regulations, there are also concealed carry laws, which
enable a gun owner to stow a firearm in a holster that is typically hidden from
view under clothing.44 Concealed carry laws are made up of three categories:
unrestricted (sometimes called “constitutional carry”), “shall issue,” and
“may issue.”45 These three categories vary in the number of requirements or
steps one must take in order to obtain a license, with “unrestricted” being the
easiest way to obtain a license and “may issue” being the most difficult.46
Currently, there are only eight “may issue” states, but this category is slowly
disappearing as courts have started to rule against “may issue” policies.47
America’s “open carry” gun laws that permit citizens to carry guns in
public contribute to the discord among the circuits when determining the
dangerousness of a gun carrier for Terry purposes.48 Regardless of one’s
personal opinion on the Second Amendment,49 Heller and McDonald have
upheld the right to carry and led states to enact their own gun-carry laws.
Therefore, these cases and laws must be followed until overruled or amended.
B. The History and Purpose of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”50 Aggressive British search and seizure practices, including the
42. Id. at 737. For example, South Dakota’s constitution declares that “[t]he right of the
citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied.” S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 24. West Virginia’s constitution states that “[a] person has the right to keep and bear
arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational
use.” W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22. And Ohio’s constitution maintains that “[t]he people have
the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are
dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination
to the civil power.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
43. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 735; Which States Allow Open Carry?, ALIEN
GEAR HOLSTERS (Apr. 3, 2019), http://aliengearholsters.com/blog/open-carry-states/
[https://perma.cc/H7C3-TMM8].
44. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 735. Concealed carry is by far the most common
method of handgun carrying today. Id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Chris W. Cox, Victory in D.C.!: Shall-Issue Concealed Carry Coming to the
Nation’s Capital, NRA-ILA (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nraila.org/articles/
20171120/victory-in-dc-shall-issue-concealed-carry-coming-to-the-nation-s-capital
[https://perma.cc/DE52-BMUX]; see also Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124,
129, 152 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the District of Columbia’s “good reason requirement,”
which requires concealed carry license applicants to “demonstrate a ‘good reason to fear injury
to his or her person or property’ or ‘any other proper reason for carrying a pistol’” likely places
an unconstitutional burden on the Second Amendment “right to carry firearms for self-defense
both in and outside the home”).
48. See infra Part II.
49. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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use of general warrants,51 in England and the American colonies are viewed
as the “catalysts” for the Fourth Amendment’s adoption.52 A general warrant
is “unparticularized as to the place or things to be searched for or . . . lack[s]
specific factual grounds justifying the search.”53 It therefore gives law
enforcement officers freedom to “[rummage] in a person’s belongings” and
discover evidence of wrongdoing without specifying the exact things or
places to be searched.54 These British general warrant practices led states to
adopt search and seizure provisions in their local constitutions soon after
declaring independence.55 In fact, after the U.S. Constitution was drafted in
1779 (without the Bill of Rights), some “states requested that the new
Constitution be amended to provide protection against unjustified searches
and seizures.”56 This was the basis and background for what is now the
Fourth Amendment.
Today’s Fourth Amendment includes a “warrant requirement.”57 This
requirement dictates that searches are generally considered reasonable if (1)
a “neutral and detached magistrate”58 issues a search warrant supported by

51. See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (holding that the secretary
of state’s general warrant to arrest Entick and seize his books and papers for authoring
seditious papers constituted a trespass and that the secretary had no right to seize or inspect
Entick’s property); Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (declaring that the Crown’s
general warrant permitting messengers to break in and search people’s homes and places of
work, as well as seize papers and property without evidence that a crime had been committed,
was a violation of English common law).
52. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980 (2011).
53. Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?: The Framers Preserved CommonLaw Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 55
(2010).
54. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971).
55. See Clancy, supra note 52, at 981. For example, Connecticut’s constitution currently
states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7. And Massachusetts’s constitution currently states:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures,
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore,
are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to
make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons
or objects of search, arrest, or seizure and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases,
and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV.
56. Clancy, supra note 52, at 981.
57. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978).
58. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
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probable cause and (2) the warrant particularly describes the persons or
places to be searched or seized.59 Probable cause exists when the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge provide a reasonably
trustworthy basis for a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal
offense has been committed or is about to take place.60 The warrant
requirement, however, is often inapplicable to searches for weapons after an
investigatory stop or arrest.61 Terry outlines the steps police officers must
take to avoid violating the Fourth Amendment.62 However, as this Note
highlights, not all circuits agree as it relates to Terry’s standard—that is,
when firearms are (thought to be) present during investigatory stops.63
C. Balancing the Fourth Amendment with Public Safety: Terry v. Ohio
As discussed, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures—not all searches and seizures.64 In the Fourth
Amendment context of stops and frisks, Terry reigns supreme.65
In Terry, two men standing on a street corner caught Officer McFadden’s
attention.66 McFadden could not articulate what it was that drew him to the
men but while on patrol for shoplifters and pickpockets, he grew
suspicious.67 McFadden watched one of the men leave the street corner, walk
past a store, pause, look through the store window, walk a little further, and
then turn back, look again through the store window, and finally return back
to the original street corner.68 Upon returning to the corner, he conferred
with the other man, and then the other man went through the exact same
motions, looking through the same store window and returning to confer.69
The two men alternately repeated this ritual about six times each.70 A third
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime.”).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”).
60. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
61. See generally Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (demonstrating that the officer did not
need a warrant to frisk the defendant for the investigatory stop). There are six main exceptions
to the warrant requirement: searches incident to lawful arrest, the plain view exception,
consent, stops and frisks, the automobile exception, and emergencies and hot pursuits.
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, LAWSHELF EDUC. MEDIA, https://lawshelf.com/
courseware/entry/exceptions-to-the-warrant-requirement
[https://perma.cc/T72M-MTSD]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019). This Note only focuses on frisks for weapons during investigatory
stops.
62. See infra Part I.C.
63. See infra Part II.
64. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“It must always be remembered
that what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches
and seizures.”).
65. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968).
67. Id. at 5–6.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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man at one point joined them on the street corner to chat but then walked
away.71 After about ten-to-twelve minutes, the two men walked away in the
same path taken earlier by the third man.72 McFadden suspected that the men
planned to shoplift and considered it his duty as an officer to investigate.73
Fearing they had a gun, McFadden approached the men, identified himself
as a police officer, and asked for their names.74 The men mumbled in
response to the officer’s inquiries, and McFadden then grabbed the petitioner
and patted the outside of his clothing.75 McFadden felt a gun and removed
the petitioner’s overcoat to extract the firearm.76 He also frisked the two
other men and found a firearm on one of them.77
After being charged with carrying a concealed weapon, the petitioner
challenged the legality of the officer’s pat-down as a Fourth Amendment
violation.78 The Court, en route to affirming the petitioner’s conviction,
discussed the framework that courts would consult going forward.79
According to Terry,
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, . . . he is entitled . . . to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.80

This holding consists of two inquiries: (1) whether the officer has
observed unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity
is afoot and (2) whether the officer believes the suspect is armed and
dangerous.81 Therefore, unless these two inquiries are both answered in the
affirmative, the Fourth Amendment precludes an officer from conducting a
frisk.82
This analysis is an objective one; the Court framed it as “whether a
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”83 “[D]ue weight must
be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 6–7.
75. Id. at 7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 30.
80. Id.
81. Matthew J. Wilkins, Note, Armed and Not Dangerous?: A Mistaken Treatment of
Firearms in Terry Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1166–67 (2017).
82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
83. Id. at 27.
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‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw
from the facts in light of his experience.”84
This Note focuses on the second Terry inquiry. Assuming an officer has
observed unusual conduct and reasonably concluded that criminal activity
might be afoot (thereby permitting him to proceed to the second prong), the
dispute among the circuits is whether one must be both “armed” and
“dangerous”—two separate requirements—or whether “armed and
dangerous” is a unitary concept, implying that one is dangerous because he
possesses a gun.85 Because Terry was decided back in 1968, interpreting its
framework today—in light of recent gun law developments enshrining the
individual right to bear arms (i.e., Heller and McDonald ) and instituting state
“open carry” laws enabling public firearm possession—has proven
problematic.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ARMED AND (THEREFORE) DANGEROUS?
This Part discusses how courts have wrestled with the aforementioned
problems surrounding the second Terry prong and the resulting circuit split.
Part II.A revisits Robinson to demonstrate the difficulty in determining
whether “armed and dangerous” should be a unitary concept or not. Part II.B
presents the circuits involved in the split and explains each side’s reasons for
their positions.
A. The Difficulty in Rendering a Robinson Decision
To illustrate courts’ difficulty in applying Terry’s framework in
investigatory stop cases, this Part outlines Robinson’s procedural history and
details each court’s analysis and holding in turn. As previously discussed,
each succeeding court overruled the previous one, with Robinson ultimately
being convicted for illegally possessing a firearm—the fruit of the officer’s
lawful search.86
1. Robinson I
After a thorough analysis of the case’s relevant facts87 and Terry’s
framework,88 Magistrate Judge Robert Trumble in United States v.
Robinson89 (Robinson I ), recommended that Robinson’s motion to suppress
be granted.90 In his report and recommendation (“R & R”), Magistrate Judge
84. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2013) (“To
find that reasonable suspicion existed” so as to justify a stop, “the Court must examine the
totality of the circumstances in the situation at hand.”).
85. See infra Part II.
86. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 701–02 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379
(Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 1–11.
88. See supra Part I.C.
89. No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064038, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 8, 2014), report and
recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035
(N.D.W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014).
90. Robinson I, 2014 WL 4064038, at *14.
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Trumble reasoned that accepting the government’s position—that the
anonymous tip, location within a high-crime area, and “weird look” were
sufficient to prove that Robinson was “dangerous” and justify a frisk—would
lead “every person legally carrying a gun” to “be at risk for invasion of their
privacy” merely because the notion that they are “dangerous” would always
follow if there is suspicion that they are “armed.”91 Judge Trumble thereby
rejected the proposition that being “armed” automatically makes one
“dangerous.”92 As such, something more than suspicion of a firearm would
be needed for a police officer to legally conduct a frisk.93
2. Robinson II
In United States v. Robinson94 (Robinson II ), the District Court considered
Robinson I ’s R & R. The prosecution objected to the magistrate judge’s
R & R, and so, District Judge Gina Groh reevaluated the case.95 The district
court “review[ed] those portions of the R & R to which the United States
object[ed] de novo and the remainder of the R & R for clear error.”96
The district court disagreed with Robinson I, holding that when looking at
the totality of the circumstances, “there [were] objective and particularized
facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that [Robinson] was armed and
dangerous.”97 The district court found that because the officers located “the
vehicle in the same high-crime area as the 7-Eleven mere minutes removed
from the tip,” and because the officers believed that Robinson “looked weird
when asked if he was armed” rather than verbally responding, a “reasonably
prudent officer . . . [would] believe that the officer’s safety or that of others
was in danger.”98
In his response to the government’s objection to the R & R, Robinson
argued that “some sort of facial expression” and a tip indicating that he
merely possessed a loaded gun failed to supply any evidence of actual
knowledge that Robinson’s actions constituted a crime and thus were
insufficient grounds for conviction.99 But while he was able to convince the
magistrate judge, he could not convince the district court.100 Robinson’s
motion to suppress was denied.101

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014), rev’d, 814 F.3d 201
(4th Cir. 2016).
95. Id. at *4.
96. Id. at *1.
97. Id. at *4.
98. Id.
99. Response to United States’ Objections to Report and Recommendation That the
Motion to Suppress Be Granted at 2, 5–6, Robinson II, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035
(Aug. 14, 2014).
100. See Robinson II, 2014 WL 4064035, at *1.
101. See id. at *4.
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3. Robinson III
Robinson appealed the district court’s findings, and the case made its way
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In United States
v. Robinson102 (Robinson III ), Circuit Judge Pamela Harris reversed the
district court and granted the motion to suppress.103
The Fourth Circuit first held that “in states like West Virginia, which
broadly allow public possession of firearms, reasonable suspicion that a
person . . . is armed does not by itself give rise to reasonable suspicion that
the person is dangerous for Terry purposes.”104 West Virginia permits its
citizens to carry firearms; thus, possession alone is insufficient to deem
someone “dangerous.”105
Second, Robinson’s failure to immediately respond to the police officer’s
questions did not provide an objective indication of dangerousness,
especially since “West Virginia does not appear to require that people
carrying firearms inform the police of their guns during traffic or other
stops.”106 The officers unreasonably attributed dangerousness to a “weird
look.”107
And third, while Robinson was seen loading a firearm and was
subsequently stopped in a high-crime area, the Fourth Circuit found that the
totality of the circumstances failed to provide an objective indication that
Robinson was dangerous.108 The fact that the events took place in a highcrime area, while occasionally relevant, “does not lend support to an
inference that Robinson was a danger to the police.”109 To support this
notion, Judge Harris explained, “[w]here public gun possession is legal, highcrime areas are precisely the setting in which we should most expect to see
law-abiding citizens who present no threat to officers carrying guns; there is
more, not less, reason to arm oneself lawfully for self-defense in a high-crime
area.”110
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Terry did not authorize the police officer
to frisk Robinson and so the firearm, which was found to have been possessed
illegally, was the inadmissible fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation.111

102. 814 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d on reh’g, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017).
103. Id. at 213.
104. Id. at 216.
105. Id. at 204.
106. Id. at 211.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 212–13.
109. Id. at 212 (“Whether or not a high-crime environment might make other ambiguous
conduct—for instance, fleeing from a police officer—more likely to be criminal or dangerous,
we conclude that it sheds no light on the likelihood that an individual’s gun possession poses
a danger to the police.” (citation omitted)).
110. Id. “[O]nce a state legalizes the public possession of firearms, unchecked police
discretion to single out anyone carrying a gun gives rise to ‘the potential for intentional or
unintentional discrimination based on neighborhood, class, race, or ethnicity.’” Id. at 209
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 2013)).
111. Id. at 213.
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In dissent, Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer disagreed with the circuit court’s
holding for three main reasons: (1) he interpreted Terry’s “armed and thus
dangerous” language to require that an officer need only reasonably believe
that Robinson possesses a firearm to conduct a legal frisk;112 (2) the fact that
Robinson might be legally carrying his firearm did not diminish the potential
dangerousness of the situation;113 and (3) the reasonable suspicion standard
“need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct”114—just because
someone might turn out to be innocent does not automatically mean an
officer is unreasonable and prohibited from conducting a search.115
4. Robinson IV
The case was then reheard en banc in United States v. Robinson (Robinson
IV ), and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in Robinson II
that there was reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, and therefore, the
officer’s frisk of Robinson was justified and complied with Terry’s
requirements.116 Writing for the majority, Judge Niemeyer reasoned “that
traffic stops alone are inherently dangerous for police officers” and that
“traffic stops of persons who are armed, whether legally or illegally, pose yet
a greater safety risk to police officers.”117 It concluded that because the
officers lawfully stopped Robinson for failing to wear a seatbelt and there
was reasonable suspicion to believe he was “armed” (from the anonymous
tip, which was deemed credible), the officers justifiably frisked him—
thereby adopting the notion that “armed” inherently means “dangerous.”118
The Fourth Circuit gave greater credence to possible police officer danger
than to the potential legitimacy of Robinson’s gun possession under West
Virginia law.119 Robinson’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was
denied.120
Through its procedural history, this case has shown judges arguing among
themselves regarding what characteristics of a Terry frisk situation are most
important in assessing an officer’s conduct. The importance of West
Virginia’s gun laws, the high-crime area in which the events took place, a
“weird look,” and police officer safety were all considered and given
differing weights in the analysis, leading judges to reach different
conclusions. This case epitomizes Terry’s disputed framework and
illustrates how conflicting holdings among circuit and state courts have come
to be.121
112. Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 213–14 (“The frisk authorized by Terry is justified by dangerousness, not by
criminal conduct.”).
114. Id. at 214 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014)).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 701 (holding that the officer was justified in frisking Robinson).
117. Id. at 698.
118. See id. at 701; see also infra Part II.B.1.
119. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 698, 701.
120. Robinson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
121. See infra Part II.B.
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B. Does “Armed” Mean “Dangerous”?
The difficulty courts have had in interpreting “armed and dangerous”
likely stems from Terry’s precise language.122 While the standard on its face
implies two separate requirements—“armed and dangerous”—certain
phrases within the opinion appear to make reasonable the presumption that
“armed” might inherently mean “dangerous.”123 The interpretation of
“armed and dangerous” has thus led to a split among courts.
In addition to the Fourth Circuit in Robinson IV, the Ninth124 and Tenth125
Circuits also consider a firearm to be inherently dangerous and sufficient to
satisfy the second Terry prong. Part II.B.1 considers these circuits’ views
and relevant holdings.
On the other hand, the Sixth126 and Seventh127 Circuits, as well as the
supreme courts of Arizona,128 Idaho,129 and New Mexico,130 have stated that
possession of a firearm, on its own, is insufficient to conclude that an
individual is dangerous (analogous to the holdings of Robinson I and III ).
According to these courts, a Terry frisk violates the Fourth Amendment when
there is nothing more than a reasonable suspicion that one possesses a
firearm.131 Part II.B.2 discusses these courts’ views and relevant holdings.
1. “Armed” Equals “Dangerous” Under Terry
In Robinson IV, the Fourth Circuit asserted that possession of a firearm
inherently makes one dangerous under Terry.132 Regardless of whether the
police officers in Robinson IV actually had reasonable suspicion to believe
Robinson was armed, there was little discussion regarding whether Robinson
was also dangerous—the court simply concluded that because Robinson was
armed, the situation posed a risk to the officers’ safety, and so, Robinson was
dangerous.133 In support of its determination, the court relied on both Terry
and Pennsylvania v. Mimms,134 stating:
122. See supra Part II.A.
123. For example, the phrase “armed and dangerous” is predominantly used, but Chief
Justice Earl Warren also mixes in “armed and presently dangerous,” which could imply that
the petitioner was dangerous because he was armed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 30 (1968)
(emphasis added). Additionally, the fact that the Court believed that the petitioner was “armed
and thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety” furthers the notion that one must be
dangerous because one is armed. Id. at 28 (emphasis added).
124. United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007).
125. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 491 (10th Cir. 2013).
126. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132–33 (6th Cir. 2015).
127. United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2015).
128. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 411–12 (Ariz. 2014).
129. State v. Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (Idaho 2009).
130. State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 25 (N.M. 2003).
131. See, e.g., Leo, 792 F.3d at 748; Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1131; Serna, 331 P.3d at 412;
Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1215; Vandenberg, 81 P.3d at 26.
132. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379
(Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
133. Id. at 698.
134. 434 U.S. 106 (1977). In Mimms, a driver was rightfully pulled over for driving with
an expired license plate. Id. at 107. An officer approached the car and asked the driver to step
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In both Terry and Mimms, the Court deliberately linked “armed” and
“dangerous,” recognizing that the frisks in those cases were lawful because
the stops were valid and the officer reasonably believed that the person
stopped “was armed and thus” dangerous. The use of “and thus”
recognizes that the risk of danger is created simply because the person, who
was forcibly stopped, is armed.135

The court effectively took a shortcut when determining Robinson’s
“dangerousness” by reading into Terry’s and Mimms’s precise language. The
court analyzed an apparent link between “armed” and “dangerous” to
conclude that “armed” equals “dangerous” in this case and in every case.136
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Orman,137 claimed that
“reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was carrying a gun . . . is all that
is required for a protective search under Terry.”138 Consequently, the court
believed that an officer, who was informed that the defendant had carried a
handgun into a mall and who subsequently retrieved the gun from the
defendant’s waistband, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he
had reason to suspect that the defendant was armed, thereby rendering the
defendant dangerous for Terry purposes.139
Although the defendant thought he was complying with state law140 and
was described by the officers as “calm,” “cooperative,” and “cordial,” the
court still found that there was reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal
activity was afoot and that the defendant was armed and (therefore)
dangerous.141
In the Tenth Circuit, the court in United States v. Rodriguez142 held that if
an officer sees an individual carrying a concealed handgun, he can conduct a
out of the vehicle and produce his owner’s card and operator’s license. Id. Upon exiting the
vehicle, the officer noticed a large bulge in the driver’s jacket, frisked the driver, and removed
a firearm from his pocket. Id. The driver was arrested for illegally carrying a concealed
firearm and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. Id. In holding that the firearm
was not the fruit of an unlawful search, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he bulge in the
jacket permitted the officer to conclude that [the driver] was armed, and thus posed a serious
and present danger to the safety of the officer.” Id. at 112.
135. Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 700 (citations omitted).
136. The need to rely on Terry’s precise wording underscores the difficulty in interpreting
Terry’s true standard. While Chief Justice Warren predominantly uses “armed and dangerous”
as the standard, there are enough instances in which he and other courts have diverged from
that language that calls into question the intended meaning of the “armed and dangerous”
standard.
137. 486 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007).
138. Id. at 1176.
139. See generally id.
140. While it is not illegal to carry a gun in Arizona, the specific shopping mall in which
these events took place prohibits guns, and the defendant at the time was considered a
“prohibited possessor” due to previous crimes he committed. Id.
141. See id. at 1172–73, 1176. While Robinson’s “weird look” arguably gave the
impression of dangerousness, the defendant in Orman was characterized in such a way that
seemingly would not give an impression of dangerousness. See id. at 1176. Yet, he was found
to be “dangerous” solely because he was armed. See id. at 1176–77. This highlights this side
of the split’s position—the only relevant factor in determining if someone is “dangerous” is
whether the responding officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a firearm is present.
142. 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 2013).
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frisk, despite the state’s gun possession laws.143 In Rodriguez, the officer
was notified via dispatch that two men in a convenience store were showing
each other their handguns.144 Upon arriving at the scene, the officer directed
them to step outside, and when the defendant pushed the door open, his shirt
came up, exposing his waist, and the officer saw the gun and removed it from
the defendant’s waistband.145 Once outside, the officer directed the
defendant to turn around and place his hands in a frisk position on a nearby
truck, and he proceeded to pat the defendant down, presumably to determine
whether the defendant possessed any other firearms.146 Because the officer
saw the firearm in the defendant’s waistband as they exited the store, the
officer knew that the defendant was “armed.”147 Therefore, the officer
believed that the defendant posed a threat and that he could consequently
remove the firearm.148
In its holding, the Tenth Circuit essentially adopted the broad proposition
that an officer’s knowledge of one’s possession of a firearm is sufficient for
an officer to conduct a legal frisk,149 regardless of the state’s gun laws.150
Officer safety is the driving force behind these courts’ holdings. They rely
on Terry’s observation that an officer may conduct a frisk when “nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the officer’s] reasonable
fear for his own or others’ safety.”151 Because firearms can be used to assault
officers, officers should be permitted to conduct frisks regardless of the
legality of possessing and carrying a firearm in that particular state.152
143. Id. at 490–91.
144. Id. at 483.
145. Id. at 483–84. The defendant alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when the officer removed the gun from his waistband. Id. at 484.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 490–91.
149. See id.
150. “[T]he frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not
carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law.” Id. at 491 (quoting Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). In New Mexico, carrying a concealed handgun is legal with
a license. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2 (2019) (“Unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon consists
of carrying a concealed loaded firearm . . . anywhere, except . . . by a person in possession of
a valid concealed handgun license issued to him by the department of public safety pursuant
to the provisions of the Concealed Handgun Carry Act.”). However, “the New Mexico Court
of Appeals [has] held that once a suspect acknowledged he was carrying a concealed loaded
handgun, officers had probable cause to believe he was ‘committing the crime of unlawfully
carrying a deadly weapon’ in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30–7–2, ‘and could arrest him.’”
Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 487 (quoting State v. Madsen, 5 P.3d 573, 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)).
Accordingly, since the officer directly observed the defendant concealing a handgun, he was
permitted to assume it was illegally concealed and could therefore search and seize the
defendant. See id. at 488.
151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
152. See, e.g., Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The presumptive
lawfulness of an individual’s gun possession in a particular State does next to nothing to negate
the reasonable concern an officer has for his own safety when forcing an encounter with an
individual who is armed with a gun . . . .”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No.
16-1532) (mem.); Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 491 (“We will not deny an officer making a lawful
investigatory stop the ability to protect himself from an armed suspect whose propensities are
unknown.”); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]
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Officers may even assume that a suspected gun carrier is illegally carrying
the firearm.153 Because guns can inflict serious harm, the need for officers
to promote public safety and complete their duties with limited fear
outweighs permissive state gun laws and a gun carrier’s right to carry.154 The
“armed and dangerous” standard can therefore be altered to simply read
“armed”—an officer can conduct a search when the officer suspects that the
person with whom the officer is dealing is armed.
While this side of the split weighs officer safety most heavily, the other
side of the split, while acknowledging the importance of officer safety, gives
more credence to whether or not the frisked individual was potentially
abiding by, or breaking, the particular state’s gun laws when carrying the
firearm.155
2. “Armed” Does Not Equal “Dangerous” Under Terry
On the other side of the split stand the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, as well
as the supreme courts of Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico, which have held
that the “armed and dangerous” standard requires more than simply
possessing a firearm or suspicion that a firearm is present.156
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Northrup v. City of
Toledo Police Department,157 explained that merely being armed does not
make a person “armed and dangerous” in a state that permits public carrying
of firearms.158 In defending his position, Judge Sutton explained:
While open-carry laws may put police officers . . . in awkward situations
from time to time, the Ohio legislature has decided its citizens may be
entrusted with firearms on public streets . . . . The Toledo Police
Department has no authority to disregard this decision—not to mention the
protections of the Fourth Amendment—by detaining every “gunman” who
lawfully possesses a firearm.159

Here, the court suggests that the reason the plaintiff cannot be deemed
“armed and dangerous” based solely on his possession of a firearm in public
is because such possession is entirely legal.160

reasonably prudent man in [the officer’s] circumstances would be warranted in retrieving the
gun for his safety and the safety of the mall patrons . . . . [The officer] needed to see that the
gun was removed from the premises without endangering his safety or the safety of the mall
patrons.”).
153. See Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 487.
154. See, e.g., Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 701.
155. See infra Part II.B.2.
156. See supra notes 126–32.
157. 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015).
158. See id. at 1132 (“[E]stablished law required [the police officer] to point to evidence
that [the plaintiff] may have been ‘armed and dangerous.’ Yet all [the officer] ever saw was
that [the plaintiff] was armed—and legally so.” (citation omitted) (quoting Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968))).
159. Id. at 1133.
160. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Leo161 explained that, given the
right to carry a gun in public, courts must resist the suggestion that the
possible presence of a weapon inevitably poses a threat justifying a search.162
Further, the court in United States v. Williams163 was faced with similar facts
to those presented in Robinson but held differently; whereas in Robinson the
court found an anonymous tip in a high-crime area in conjunction with the
defendant’s “weird look” to raise reasonable suspicion that the defendant was
armed and dangerous (thereby justifying a frisk),164 here, a 911 call reporting
weapons in a high-crime area and the defendant’s avoidance of eye contact
with the police officer did not justify a frisk.165 In reaching its decision, the
Seventh Circuit explained, “[m]ost people, when confronted by a police
officer, are likely to act nervous [and] avoid eye contact . . . thus making such
behaviors of very little import to a reasonable suspicion determination”166
and acknowledged that while a high-crime area might be a factor under Terry,
it is an insignificant one in this case.167
In State v. Serna,168 the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized that the
second Terry prong “involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be
‘armed and presently dangerous.’”169 However, in Serna, the defendant was
only “armed,” and possession of a firearm, on its own, is insufficient to label
an individual “dangerous.”170
In this case, two police officers were patrolling a “gang neighborhood”
when they observed the defendant and a woman in the middle of the street.171
One of the officers called the defendant over, and he obeyed, acting
“cooperative[ly] and polite[ly].”172 After observing a bulge on the
defendant’s waist, the officer asked if he had any firearms, to which the
defendant replied that he had a gun.173 Subsequently, the officer ordered the
defendant to raise his hands above his head, and the officer removed the gun
from the defendant’s waistband.174 The officers then discovered that the
defendant was a convicted felon and “arrested him as a prohibited possessor
161. 792 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2015).
162. Id. at 752.
163. 731 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2013).
164. See generally Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379
(Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
165. See generally Williams, 731 F.3d 687.
166. Id.
167. Id. (“Additionally, while we understand that the fact that a stop occurs in a high-crime
area may be a factor under Terry, we believe that the rest of the case for a frisk, here, was so
weak that this factor cannot save the frisk.”).
168. 331 P.3d 405 (Ariz. 2014).
169. Id. at 410 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
170. Id. at 410–11.
171. Id. at 406–07.
172. Id. at 407. In both Serna and Orman, the defendants, in a consensual encounter in
which they agreed to converse with police officers, were characterized as cooperative—not
suspect or dubious, which might reasonably put the officers on higher alert. However, the two
cases had vastly different outcomes, mostly because of the courts’ interpretation of the Terry
standard.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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of a firearm.”175 The defendant “moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of a
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”176
Agreeing with the defendant, the court explained that “[i]n a state such as
Arizona that freely permits citizens to carry weapons . . . the mere presence
of a gun cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that the gun
carrier is presently dangerous.”177 In fact, “[t]o conclude otherwise would
potentially subject countless law-abiding persons to patdowns solely for
exercising their right to carry a firearm.”178
Like the Sixth Circuit in Northrup, the Arizona Supreme Court
acknowledged and sympathized with the need for police officers to protect
themselves; however, in light of the legislature’s gun laws, the constitutional
and state rights guaranteed to all citizens must not be infringed.179
Similarly, in State v. Bishop,180 the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged
that “weapon possession, in and of itself, does not necessarily mean that a
person poses a risk of danger.”181 Here, the police officer thought that the
defendant’s “physical body language, [and] everything about [the situation]
made [him] feel that [Bishop] could possibly have a weapon on him.”182 But
the court found that the defendant was not dangerous, as “he did not act
threatening, did not have a reputation for violence, did not make any furtive
movements, and was cooperative and polite.”183 Therefore, the court held
the officer’s search unconstitutional and warned that, in a state that permits
its citizens to carry firearms, holding an individual in possession to be
“dangerous” for Terry purposes would justify a police officer frisking anyone
he thinks might have a gun.184
Finally, in State v. Vandenberg,185 the New Mexico Supreme Court noted,
“[t]o justify a frisk for weapons, an officer must have a sufficient degree of
articulable suspicion that the person being frisked is both armed and
presently dangerous.”186 Indeed, the court explained that “[a]ny indication
in previous cases that an officer need only suspect that a party is either armed
or dangerous is expressly disavowed.”187 While this case upholds the
defendant’s conviction for illegally possessing marijuana after the police
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 410.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 411 (“While we understand the need for officers to protect themselves in the
course of their duties, we must balance that weighty interest against the ‘inestimable right’ of
citizens to be free from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures.” (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1968)).
180. 203 P.3d 1203 (Idaho 2009).
181. Id. at 1218 (citing State v. Henage, 152 P.3d 16, 23 (Idaho 2007)).
182. Id. at 1218–19.
183. Id. at 1218.
184. See id. at 1219 n.13 (“If an officer’s bare assertion that a suspect ‘could possibly’ be
carrying a weapon was enough to establish that a person posed a risk of danger, officers could
frisk any person with whom they come into contact.”).
185. 81 P.3d 19 (N.M. 2003).
186. Id. at 25.
187. Id.
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officer’s legal frisk, it made clear its understanding that, on its own, suspicion
of a gun is not sufficient to deem someone “dangerous” under Terry.188
The primary argument underlying this understanding of Terry is that a
state’s decision to permit its citizens to carry firearms in public should
prevent an officer from conducting a frisk merely out of fear that anyone
carrying a gun could pose a threat to the officer and those in the immediate
vicinity.189 That is not to say that these courts disregard the importance of
public safety. They acknowledge it and give it due weight in the analysis but
appear to dislike the notion that a law-abiding citizen can be inherently
dangerous for doing what the state has given him the freedom to do—that is,
carry a firearm in public.190 The courts defer to the legislature’s decision to
permit the state’s citizens to carry firearms and avoid weakening the
significance of that decision by holding in a way that materially reduces the
freedom that the decision was intended to afford.191
The “armed and dangerous” standard can therefore be altered to simply
read “dangerous”—an officer can conduct a search when the officer
reasonably believes that the person with whom the officer is dealing is
dangerous. And possessing a firearm, on its own, does not make a person
dangerous for Terry purposes.
III. MERELY BEING “ARMED” SHOULD NOT MAKE ONE INHERENTLY
“DANGEROUS” IN PUBLIC CARRY STATES
Federal circuit and state supreme courts have inconsistently determined
whether armed individuals in states with lenient “public carry” laws are
inherently dangerous based solely on the fact that they are armed.192
Consequently, individuals exercising their Second Amendment and stategiven rights, via Heller and McDonald, are at risk of having their Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
restricted. Therefore, Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard should not be
interpreted as “armed and therefore dangerous” in states that permit citizens
to carry firearms, whether concealed or openly, in public. While Terry
controls Fourth Amendment investigatory stop inquiries, its standard needs
to be interpreted and applied in light of evolving understandings of the
Second Amendment and state gun laws, which have drastically changed
since the 1968 Terry opinion.
Part III.A argues that Terry’s standard must be reevaluated in light of
Second Amendment and state gun law developments that have occurred over
the last fifty years. Part III.B explains how “armed and therefore dangerous”
might require gun carriers to sacrifice one constitutional right to exercise
188. See generally id.
189. See United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 2015); Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1218–
19.
190. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 2015);
State v. Serna 331 P.3d 405, 411 (Ariz. 2014).
191. See Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1133.
192. See supra Part II.
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another and argues that the potential for a legal gun carrier to pose a threat is
not significantly more important than maintaining the integrity of
constitutional rights.
A. 1968 to Today: Expanding Gun Rights
As this Note highlights, Terry, decided in 1968, has led to inconsistent
results around the country regarding the inherent dangerousness of an
individual possessing a firearm in a state legally permitting its citizens to
possess one.193 But over fifty years has passed since Terry, and the legal
landscape of the Second Amendment and gun ownership rights has
changed.194 Heller, decided in 2008, gave Americans the individual right to
possess firearms in the home for self-defense, and two years later, McDonald
extended the Second Amendment rights recognized by Heller to the states.195
In 1968, it was illegal for anyone other than a police officer to carry a
concealed firearm in Ohio.196 Under these circumstances, as soon as the
officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed, he
technically also had reason to believe that his life or that of others was in
danger.197 But today, Ohio is a “shall issue” state, which means that the state
must issue a concealed carry license to anyone who applies for a license,
meets certain criteria, and passes certain courses.198 Therefore, while the
presumption that holds anyone possessing a firearm to be inherently
dangerous made sense under the 1968 law, it does not make sense today—
reasonable suspicion that an individual is “armed” does not mean that he
illegally possesses the firearm or is otherwise breaking the law.199 Presently,
people have more expansive gun possession rights than in the past,200 and
these rights should play a larger role in Terry analyses.
Northrup exemplifies how today’s gun laws should be considered in
comparison to a Terry analysis occurring in 1968. The case, like Terry, took
place in Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit focused on the legality of firearm
possession in the state to adopt a baseline assumption that one’s possession
of a firearm is not illegal until an officer proves that it is.201 In requiring
193. See supra Part II.
194. See supra Part I.A.
195. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
196. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 n.1 (1968).
197. Because the law forbade citizens from carrying a concealed firearm, it follows that
anyone breaking this law and concealing a firearm poses a threat to the officer’s safety or to
the safety of others since the officer would not ordinarily expect an individual to conceal a
firearm.
198. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 735.
199. See United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 691 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[A]s public
possession and display of firearms become lawful under more circumstances, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and police practices must adapt.”).
200. See supra Part I.A.
201. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Where
it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’” (quoting
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013))).

2019]

“ARMED AND DANGEROUS” AFTER TERRY

1055

officers to highlight environmental factors other than firearm possession in
search analyses, the court explained that Ohioans have placed their trust in
“their State’s approach to gun licensure and gun possession,” and therefore,
the state’s lenient stance on gun possession signifies that an individual cannot
be “dangerous” for Terry purposes solely because an individual is
“armed.”202
Comparing these two Ohio cases is critical, as it demonstrates the
differences in judicial analysis based on the relevant status of gun laws at the
time. Between 1968 and 2015, Ohio’s stance on gun laws changed.203
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the two courts’ holdings aligned with the
state’s gun laws at the time. But the Fourth Circuit in Robinson, on the other
hand, held in an unexpected way. West Virginia, like Ohio, is a “shall issue”
state and allows open carry;204 yet, the Fourth Circuit still essentially held
that “armed” equals “dangerous.”205 Therefore, not only is Terry’s standard
inconsistently interpreted nationwide (as evidenced by the circuit split) but it
is also unpredictably interpreted—courts’ interpretations of Terry do not
always align with the particular state’s gun laws.206 To complicate matters
further, in some states, state courts hold one way while federal courts hold
another.207 It is therefore clear that something needs to be done to remedy
the confusion.
Terry’s framework might not be insufficient, but its interpretation cannot
be arbitrary—especially in the modern era wherein gun possession is a right
freely exercised and permitted in many states. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court has granted Americans the right to possess firearms,208 and further
202. Id. at 1133. This Note does not intend to debate whether a particular state’s stance on
gun possession is correct. Rather, it intends to interpret and apply a standard with significant
Fourth Amendment privacy implications in a just and constitutional fashion. Therefore, if a
state has lenient gun laws, then those laws must protect the rights they enshrine (e.g., gun
rights), rather than allowing other laws or judicial interpretations (e.g., “armed” equals
“dangerous”) to attack those rights.
203. Terry elucidates that nobody could carry a concealed firearm in 1968. See supra notes
196–98. Currently, Ohio is a “shall issue” state, which allows its citizens to carry a concealed
firearm with a permit. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 735.
204. See Ohio, OPENCARRY.ORG, https://opencarry.org/state-info-n-s/ohio/ [https://
perma.cc/7T7J-RB4C] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (summarizing Ohio’s open carry policy);
West Virginia Gun Carry Laws: Updated Concealed Carry Guide, GUNS TO CARRY,
https://www.gunstocarry.com/gun-laws-state/west-virginia-gun-laws/
[https://perma.cc/
XJ6J-3P8G] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) (outlining West Virginia’s “shall issue” and open
carry policies).
205. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct.
30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
206. See generally id.
207. Compare United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that
“armed” equals “dangerous” at the Tenth Circuit, which has jurisdiction over the District of
New Mexico), and United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
“armed” equals “dangerous” according to the Ninth Circuit, which has jurisdiction over the
District of Arizona), with State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405 (Ariz. 2014) (holding that “armed” does
not inherently mean “dangerous” at the Arizona Supreme Court), and State v. Vandenberg, 81
P.3d 19 (N.M. 2003) (stating that “armed” does not inherently mean “dangerous” at the New
Mexico Supreme Court).
208. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

1056

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

incorporated that right against the states,209 which are each comprised of
elected officials supposedly representative of each state’s interests, it follows
that states are in the best position to either interpret Terry and apply its
standard or weigh in as to the inherent dangerousness of gun possessors.
Courts, therefore, should consult the state’s gun laws when determining the
inherent dangerousness of a gun possessor in that particular state.
Moreover, “[s]tates [have] great latitude under their police powers to
legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons.”210 Consequently, considering that many states did legislate to
allow for the public carrying of firearms,211 neither the federal government
nor the judiciary should categorically deem every gun carrier “dangerous.”
States have entrusted their citizens to carry guns safely,212 and, as such, the
inherent dangerousness of a gun carrier should reflect those states’ decisions.
While allowing people to publicly carry firearms cannot change Fourth
Amendment law, “it does change the facts on the ground to which Fourth
Amendment standards apply.”213 And given that circumstances have
changed to the point that publicly carrying firearms is not illegal or unusual,
“courts must take into account that changed circumstance in applying the
familiar Terry standard.”214
Therefore, Terry’s disputed, unclear language regarding the inherent
dangerousness of a gun carrier should be interpreted to reflect the states’
views towards gun possession. In states that broadly permit their citizens to
carry firearms, like West Virginia, “armed” should be distinct from
“dangerous,” especially when the police confrontation stems primarily from
a routine traffic violation, like in Robinson. Thus, given the evolution of gun
rights and the current arbitrariness in courts’ views towards a gun carrier,215
the leniency or strictness of a state’s public carry gun laws should dictate a
court’s decision on the issue.
B. The Threat a Gun Carrier Could Potentially Pose Is Not a Significantly
Greater Public Policy Consideration Than Maintaining Constitutional
Rights
If gun carriers are deemed inherently dangerous, then the Fourth
Amendment does little to protect them against searches and seizures. As of
now, it is apparently not unreasonable for an officer to search a law-abiding,

209. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
210. Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 706 (Wynn, J., concurring) (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon,
546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006)).
211. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
212. Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 708 (Harris, J., dissenting).
213. Id.
214. Id. These changed circumstances should sway courts away from adopting such a
bright-line rule that Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard is a unitary concept, wherein an
“armed” individual is “per se dangerous” in states that permit their citizens to carry firearms
in public. Id. at 707.
215. See supra notes 202–08 and accompanying text.
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gun-carrying individual without further inquiry in some states.216 The Fourth
Amendment, therefore, is not guaranteed to gun carriers—it is a protection
that they may need to sacrifice if they want to exercise their Second
Amendment and state-given rights to publicly carry firearms.217 On the other
hand, to preserve Fourth Amendment protections, they may need to sacrifice
their rights to carry firearms. Americans should not have to opt out of one
right to opt into another—the two rights should be exercisable
concurrently.218 But that does not appear to occur with the “armed and
therefore dangerous” understanding of Terry.219 Relying on a state’s gun
laws to determine the inherent dangerousness of a gun carrier would help
resolve this issue.
Promoting police protection and public safety are important public policy
considerations.220 Guns undoubtedly have the potential to inflict serious
harm, and so, reducing the already small probability of a legal gun carrier
using his or her firearm inappropriately221 to zero likely makes police officers
feel more secure.222 But the potential to inflict serious harm is a central
reason that firearms are carried in the first place—for self-defense.223
The undisputed point of a police officer’s authority to conduct a limited
search of an individual suspected of carrying a firearm is to protect the officer
and surrounding area from a potentially dangerous situation.224 And the
inquiry has always been an objective one that takes into account the totality

216. See, e.g., Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 701 (holding a gun possessor to be inherently
dangerous for Terry purposes); United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 491–92 (10th Cir.
2013) (same); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007) (same).
217. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 706 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[T]he majority decision
today necessarily leads to the conclusion that individuals who elect to carry firearms forego
other constitutional rights, like the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); id. at 711 (Harris, J., dissenting)
(“[B]y equating ‘armed’ with ‘dangerous’ even in states where the carrying of guns is widely
permitted, the majority’s [‘armed’ is per se ‘dangerous’] rule has the effect of depriving
countless law-abiding citizens of what otherwise would be their Fourth Amendment and other
constitutional rights.”).
218. As seen in Part I.B, Entick—although an old British case—illustrates the point. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text. The holding in that case, although not directly, protects
the exercise of one constitutional right from eliminating another. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text. What would be Entick’s freedom of speech and press rights under the
First Amendment (had this been an American case after the adoption of the Bill of Rights)
does not infringe on what would be his Fourth Amendment protections prohibiting general
warrants. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. This means that he would not need to
sacrifice his Fourth Amendment protection to exercise his freedom of speech and press rights,
and vice versa. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The same should be the case here—
one should not sacrifice Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections for exercising the
state-given and Second Amendment right—emanating from Heller and McDonald—to
publicly carry a gun, and vice versa.
219. See State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014).
220. See supra Part II.B.1.
221. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2015)
(explaining that legally licensed gun possessors rarely use their firearms to commit violent
crimes).
222. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
223. See supra text accompanying note 110.
224. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
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of the circumstances.225 The only aspect that needs to be reconsidered is the
entitlement to search upon minimal suspicion that the individual possesses a
firearm. A gun can be a factor in the objective analysis of whether the
individual is dangerous enough to warrant a frisk, but a situation or person is
not inherently dangerous merely because someone possesses a gun where
possession is not illegal.226 Claiming that “armed” does not automatically
mean “dangerous” also does not mean that guns are inherently safe, or lack
the potential to inflict harm.227 It simply means that the totality of the
circumstances condition should not be met as soon as the officer suspects a
firearm is present.228
Holding that an armed individual is not inherently dangerous does not
minimize the officer’s authority to promote public safety in dangerous
situations. Differentiating between “armed” and “dangerous” protects lawabiding gun carriers from the unnecessary “petty indignity”229 of a search
solely because the gun carrier is exercising the right to carry a firearm.230
But this does not eliminate a police officer’s ability to search an individual
who the officer has reason to believe poses a threat—the threat just needs to
be beyond mere gun possession,231 which, as a default status, is not illegal.232
“Armed” means that one is equipped with a weapon.233 But courts have
interpreted “weapons” to be numerous everyday objects, including a baseball
bat, a sharpened pencil, a rope, and even a stick.234 Therefore, interpreting
Terry’s standard as a unitary concept is an “absurdity” that permits an officer
to frisk any individual “armed” with any everyday object that could
conceivably be used as a “weapon.”235 It also permits the officer to ignore

225. See, e.g., State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 25 (N.M. 2003).
226. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir.
2015).
227. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) (Harris, J., dissenting) (“Guns, of
course, are in some sense intrinsically dangerous. But the question under Terry is whether a
person carrying a gun is a danger to the police or others.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct.
30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).
228. See Robinson I, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064038, at *13 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 8,
2014) (explaining that everyone carrying a gun will be at risk of having their privacy violated
if “armed and therefore dangerous” is the standard), report and recommendation adopted in
part and rejected in part, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014).
229. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17.
230. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 707 (Harris, J., dissenting).
231. See, e.g., Robinson I, 2014 WL 4064038, at *14.
232. See Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Where it is lawful to possess a firearm, unlawful possession ‘is not the default status.’”
(quoting United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013))).
233. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 703 (Wynn, J., concurring).
234. See id. at 703–04 (quoting Wright v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 1146, 1149 n.3 (1985)).
235. See id. at 703. Considering the absurd objects that one could be “armed” with further
demonstrates that one is not dangerous merely because one is armed. Rather, an individual is
dangerous because of the totality of the circumstances that indicate that he or she poses a
threat. A woman “leaving a convenience store ‘armed’ with a bottle of wine” can hardly be
considered dangerous for holding the bottle of wine. Id. But she could be dangerous if the
totality of the circumstances suggests that she intends to inflict harm upon another or commit
an unlawful act.
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the true totality of the circumstances—including whether the state legislature
has acted to enable state citizens to openly carry firearms.236
While public safety and preserving constitutional rights are both important
policy considerations, it is difficult to conclude that one is significantly more
important than the other in this context. Requiring police officers to point to
other objective indicators of dangerousness beyond mere gun possession
might “engender serious safety concerns,”237 but it does not significantly
reduce their ability to conduct investigatory stops safely. Nothing prevents
an officer from deeming a gun carrier “dangerous” if the attendant situation
suggests as much—an officer cannot just assume that a gun carrier is
“dangerous” merely for carrying a gun when the state permits its citizens to
carry firearms.238 On the other hand, holding a gun possessor to be inherently
dangerous “has the effect of depriving countless law-abiding citizens of what
would otherwise be their Fourth Amendment and other constitutional
rights.”239 Consequently, the threat that a gun possessor could conceivably
pose does not warrant the certain interference with the integrity of his or her
constitutional rights.
Because each state has its own gun laws, a blanket statement such as
“armed and therefore dangerous” clashes with the idea that elected officials
are, and have always been, representative of the state’s people.240 The state’s
elected officials implement gun legislation,241 and, as such, having the
judiciary step in and delegitimize the state legislature’s authority by creating
dissonance between the state’s laws and police’s investigatory procedures is
inappropriate unless the state’s laws are unconstitutional. To fix this, courts
should strongly consider a state’s gun laws when confronted with Terry
situations in the future and require more than mere possession of a firearm to
conduct a frisk in states that permit their citizens to carry firearms in public.
CONCLUSION
Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard, which permits police officers to
conduct searches of individuals perceived to pose a threat to the officers’ or
general public’s safety, has led circuit and state supreme courts to resolve
similar cases differently. The dispute among the courts as to whether an
“armed” individual is inherently “dangerous” solely for carrying a firearm
implicates the Fourth and Second Amendments, as well as state gun laws.
The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures is integral to Americans’ privacy interests and to their protection
from overzealous governmental intrusion into personal matters. The Second
236. See, e.g., State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 25 (N.M. 2003).
237. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 716 (Harris, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132 (6th Cir.
2015).
239. Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 711 (Harris, J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. II (“The legislature of this State shall be composed
of the representatives of the people . . . .”).
241. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 708 (Harris, J., dissenting) (explaining that after Heller
and McDonald, state laws were enacted to expand public carry rights).
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Amendment, as interpreted by Heller, incorporated against the states by
McDonald, and expanded by state laws to permit individuals to openly carry
firearms in public, provides Americans with the means to defend themselves
against outside threats.
Given the role that these rights have played throughout American history,
and continue to play today, infringing upon either must not be tolerated
unless there is a significantly greater opposing interest at stake. The need to
protect officers and the general public from gun carriers who might legally
possess their firearms, while important, is not a significantly greater interest
that warrants interfering with the integrity of gun carriers’ constitutional and
state-given rights in states that have passed laws to allow their citizens to
openly carry firearms in public. Further, because American gun rights have
considerably evolved since the 1968 Terry opinion, the standard for a police
officer to bypass one’s Fourth Amendment rights and conduct a search
should reflect today’s gun rights in a particular state rather than reflecting the
more restrictive gun rights in place in 1968. Therefore, in states with
permissive gun laws that allow their citizens to carry firearms in public,
objective factors other than suspicion or knowledge that a firearm is present
should be required for an officer to conduct a search. In these states, merely
being “armed” should not automatically make one “dangerous” and subject
to a police search.

